SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 260547, November 26, 2024 ]
XXX260547,* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
I concur. The ponencia correctly ordered XXX260547 acquittal because the Information failed to accurately state the crime charged. This resulted in the prosecution's failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the ponencia more pertinently highlights the problem with the State's intrusion into its peoples' intimate affairs and relationships. I offer the following discussion in support of the ponencia's conclusion of acquittal and to enrich discourse on the inherent problem with penalizing "infidelity" in marital relationships.
XXX260547's Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court questioned his prior conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004." The Information charging XXX260547 with the crime reads as follows:
That starting in August 2014 and up to present in Brgy. ███████, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being the lawful husband of private complainant [AAA260547], did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit act or series of acts likely to cause said complainant to suffer psychological abuse by leaving said complainant in order to live with another woman (Melinda B. Lopez) and by totally neglecting to provide his two (2) children with the complainant the necessary support to the damage and prejudice of said [AAA260547].
Contrary to Section 5(i) in relation to Section 6 of [Republic Act No.] 9262 otherwise known as The Anti-Violence against Women and Children Act of 2004.1
During trial, the prosecution presented testimonial evidence from XXX260547's wife, AAA260547, Punong Barangay Angelito Catubig (Angelito), and XXX260547's niece, CCC260547. AAA260547 testified that XXX260547 left her and their two children without support to live with his mistress, Melinda Lopez (Melinda), with whom he also had a child. AAA260547 also testified that her children with XXX260547 were already of legal age. Angelito confirmed that AAA260547 had previously filed complaints against XXX260547. Finally, CCC260547 testified that XXX260547 had a second child with Melinda. CCC260547 added that she accompanied AAA260547 to confirm Melinda's children's records with the Municipal Civil Registrar.2
In his defense, XXX260547 testified that he remitted around 80% of his salary in his 32 years as a seafarer to AAA260547, who was unable to save any of it, instead burdening their family with debt. This led him to leave their conjugal home to live by himself. He admitted to having a child with Melinda, subsequently providing them with support, but he denied living together with her. He also admitted that he stopped remitting money and speaking to AAA260547 because "he no longer trusted her."3
The Regional Trial Court found XXX260547 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 "through marital infidelity and failure to provide financial support" to his wife, AAA260547.4
The Court of Appeals affirmed XXX260547's conviction on appeal. It found that XXX260547's extra-marital affair caused AAA260547 "mental and emotional anguish."5 The Court of Appeals similarly denied XXX260547's subsequent motion for reconsideration.6
Thus, XXX260547 filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, arguing that the Information charging him with the offense failed to state all the elements constituting a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. He also insisted that Section 5(i) punishes repeated marital infidelity, which could not apply to him absent proof of his repeated infidelity to AAA260547.7
I agree with the ponencia's ruling of acquittal. AAA260547 and the prosecution failed to establish the elements for a conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Further, I offer insight on marital infidelity as it pertains to the protections provided under Republic Act No. 9262.
I
The ponencia correctly ruled that the Information failed to adequately charge the petitioner with an offense punishable by Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, which provides:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
. . . .
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children. (Emphasis supplied)
By charging XXX260547 with acts that were "causing or likely to cause complainant to suffer psychological abuse[,]"8 the ponencia concluded that the prosecution confused the punishable harm of causing "mental and emotional anguish," with the means for its commission.9 The ponencia's reference to Dinamling v. People10 provides ample basis for this conclusion:
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party.11
Generally, an Information's failure to charge an offense will not immediately result in an acquittal and would only merit an opportunity for the prosecution to amend the Information.12 However, I offer the following discussion in support of the XXX260547's acquittal.
II
I concur with the ponencia's reasoning in granting XXX260547's acquittal, as it reflects my concerns with criminalizing intimate and private aspects of interpersonal relationships.
Republic Act No. 9262 pursues an equitable purpose by protecting women and children against violence, which may be committed through methods that leverage the systemic inequality inherent in our patriarchal society. By recognizing forms of violence other than physical violence, the law attempts to realize its institutional role of adapting to evolving social concepts, such as those of consent, personal autonomy, and power inequalities in gender relations.
Estacio v. Estacio13 discussed the concept of psychological abuse as a form of violence that Republic Act No. 9262 seeks to address:
As a form of psychological violence, coercive control pertains to a "pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic deprivation."
In relationships where coercive control exists, dominant partners do things that help them exert long-term power and control over their partners, such as isolating them from society, manipulating their children, using their male privilege, or employing economic abuse.
While domestic abuse has traditionally been seen only through physical abuse, violence can and does occur in other forms, such as psychological abuse. It is helpful to not only look at isolated acts — usually of physical abuse — but to also focus on the effects of these acts on the coercion and control of one partner over the other. To achieve a fuller understanding of domestic violence, its distorting consequences on the dynamics that exist in an intimate relationship should be important considerations. Its damaging effects on the freedom of victims to live their lives in peace are, after all, what the law ultimately seeks to eliminate.14 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, the law requires the Court to determine how the acts, alleged as psychologically abusive, result in the victim's mental or emotional anguish. In XXX v. People,15 this Court convicted the accused under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 based on established facts showing the victim's psychological trauma:
Marital infidelity is one of the forms of psychological violence. The prosecution in this case was able to satisfactorily establish petitioner's marital infidelity, his cohabitation with CCC who even bore him a child, and his abandonment of AAA. BBB's psychological trauma was evident when she wept in open court upon being asked to narrate petitioner's infidelity. In particular, BBB explained that she was deeply hurt because her father had another family and loved other woman other than her mother, BBB.16 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Further, Araza v. People17 discussed the need to consider the parties' personal circumstances in establishing the existence of psychological violence that results in emotional suffering or anguish.18
Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party.19 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
I therefore agree with the ponencia's reference to "the degree of specificity required by law"20 in alleging and proving the elements of the crimes punished under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Not only did the Information fail to allege the acts of psychological violence that led to AAA260547's emotional suffering, but the evidence on record also failed to establish the parties' personal circumstances that show the emotional abuse and suffering punishable under Republic Act No. 9262.
III
The lower courts' prior findings of guilt beyond reasonable doubt reflect the tendency to correlate marital infidelity with sexual infidelity. These conclusions fail to see how marital infidelity encompasses more than non-monogamy. More pertinently, marital infidelity involves the abuse and violation of the agreement between parties to a marital relationship.
In any event, marital infidelity, while hurtful, will not by itself amount to psychological violence, as contemplated under Republic Act No. 9262. Instead, our law requires proof of how these acts have affected the marital relationship and the parties' emotional well-being. This requires the court to weigh the circumstances of the parties' intimate relationship that are deeply personal and rarely objective. Thus, any determination of marital infidelity as psychological violence requires the court's conscious discernment and judicial restraint.
Every intimate relationship is unique. To craft rigid jurisprudential rules of what does and does not amount to marital infidelity will unreasonably exclude a broad majority of intimate relationships, effectively negating people's richly varied culture, beliefs, and personal experiences.
More broadly, conscious judicial restraint allows our people to define for themselves what marital infidelity is, relative to their own unique relationships and experiences. This is a matter in which the State has neither any expertise nor any right to interfere, as it pertains to the most intimate and private aspect of a person's rights—the right to choose whom and how to love, as well as when that love may be betrayed or withdrawn.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition.
Footnotes
* In line with Amended Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 7610, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
1 Ponencia, p. 2.
2 Id. at 2-3.
3 Id. at 4.
4 Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 6. Citation omitted.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id. at 10-11.
10 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
11 Id. at 376.
12 Dio v. People, 786 Phil. 726, 742 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
13 885 Phil. 157 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
14 Id. at 177-178.
15 G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
16 Id. at 10. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
17 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
18 Id. at 919.
19 Id.
20 Ponencia, p. 11.
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